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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
Preempts State Law Causes of Action Against
ERISA-Regulated Benefit Plans: Aetna Health, Inc.
v. Davila
EMPLOYMENT LAw - EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
ACT - EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS - FEDERAL PREEMPTION - The
Supreme Court of the United States held that ERISA preempts a
Texas state law allowing claims against ERISA-regulated em-
ployee benefit plans for denial of coverage.
Aetna Health Inc., v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004)
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) to ensure uniform regulation of all em-
ployee-benefit plans.' To facilitate this purpose, ERISA contains
extensively crafted preemption provisions, which guarantee exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction over employee-benefit plan regulation.!
Respondents Juan Davila (hereinafter "Davila") and Ruby Calad
(hereinafter "Calad") brought suit against their respective ERISA-
regulated employee benefit plans for violations of the Texas
Healthcare Liability Act (THCLA).' Specifically, Davila and Calad
alleged that their respective benefit plans failed to exercise ordi-
nary care in making certain coverage decisions.4
1. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2004). See also Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Program, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1998). § 1001(b) provides, in
relevant part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect... the interest of par-
ticipants in employee-benefit plans and their beneficiaries ... by establishing stan-
dards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee-benefit
plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the
federal courts.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1998).
2. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2495 (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504,
523 (1981)). See also 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
3. TEXAS Civ. PRAC. & REM. §§ 88.001-88.003 (2004 Supp. Pamphlet).
4. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2493.
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Davila, a participant5 in an employee health benefit plan admin-
istered by Aetna Healthcare, received a prescription for Vioxx
from his treating physician for arthritis pain; however, Aetna
refused to cover the medication. Rather than purchasing Vioxx
and suing Aetna for reimbursement, Davila opted to use
Naproysn, a substitute for Vioxx, from which he claimed to suffer
a severe reaction requiring hospitalization.7 Calad, a beneficiary'
of a healthcare plan administered by CIGNA Healthcare, endured
a hysterectomy requiring rectal, vaginal and bladder repair.9 Al-
though her treating physician recommended an extended hospital
stay, a CIGNA discharge nurse informed her that CIGNA would
cover only a one-day stay."° Calad subsequently suffered complica-
tions, requiring her to return to the hospital; thus, she alleged
CIGNA's failure to cover the extended stay proximately caused
her post surgery complications."
Davila and Calad brought their respective suits in Texas state
court under THCLA § 88.002,12 claiming that Aetna and CIGNA
failed to exercise ordinary care in making their treatment deci-
sions, thereby proximately causing their injuries. 1" Arguing that
Davila and Calad's causes of action fit within the scope of, and
were completely preempted by, ERISA § 502(a), Aetna and CIGNA
removed Davila and Calad's cases to federal district courts.14 In
holding that ERISA § 502 (a) preempts Davila and Calad's state
causes of action, the respective district courts refused to remand
5. A participant is "any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member
or former member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a
benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employ-
ers or members of such organization." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7).
6. Aetna, 124 S. Ct at 2493. The Supreme Court decided Davila's case on June 21,
2004, approximately three months prior to Merck's Vioxx recall due the drug's link with
increased risk of heart attack, stroke, and other cardiovascular problems. See Marc Kauf-
man, Merck Withdraws Arthritis Medication: Vioxx Maker Cites Users' Health Risks, THE
WASHINGTON POST, October 1, 2004, at Al.
7. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2493.
8. A beneficiary is "a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an em-
ployee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." 29 U.S.C. §
1002(8).
9. Roark v. Humana, 307 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2002).
10. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2493.
11. Id.
12. The Texas Civil Code states, "A health insurance carrier, health maintenance or-
ganization, or other managed care entity ... has the duty to exercise ordinary care when
making health care treatment decisions and is liable for damages for harm to an insured or
enrollee proximately caused by its failure to exercise such ordinary care." TEXAS CIV.
PRAC. & REM. §§ 88.002(a) (2004).
13. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2493.
14. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
346 Vol. 43
Winter 2005 Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila
the cases to state court.15 Davila and Calad each opted not to
amend their complaints to bring claims under ERISA; thus, the
respective district courts dismissed the complaints with preju-
dice.16 Davila and Calad both appealed the district courts' refusal
to remand their respective cases to state court.17
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated Davila and Ca-
lad's actions with multiple other district court actions that all con-
sidered whether ERISA preempted Texas state law negligence
claims against the parties' respective benefit plans. 8 In its analy-
sis of Davila and Calad's claims, the Fifth Circuit noted that
ERISA provides for complete preemption' 9 under § 502(a) and con-
flict preemption under § 514.20 The court of appeals then deter-
mined that Davila's and Calad's claims could only arise under ei-
ther § 502 (a)(2) or § 502(a)(1)(B), neither of which, the court con-
cluded, preempted Davila and Calad's state causes of action.2' The
Fifth Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court decision
in Pegram v. Herdrich22 in classifying Davila and Calad's claims as
those involving "mixed eligibility and treatment decisions."23 As a
result of this classification, the appellate court concluded the
claims were not fiduciary in nature under § 502(a)(2) and thus not
completely preempted by that section of ERISA. 4 With respect to
§ 502(a)(1)(B), the court of appeals held, in reliance on Pilot Life
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux25 and Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v.
15. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2493.
16. Id. When a court dismisses a complaint "with prejudice," the complainant "is fore-
closed from filing a suit again on the same claim or claims." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 482
(7th ed. 1999).
17. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2493.
18. Roark, 307 F.3d at 302.
19. Complete preemption occurs when a federal statute's preemptive force is "so ex-
traordinary and all-encompassing that it converts an ordinary state-common-law complaint
into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 279 (7th ed. 1999).
20. Roark, 307 F.3d at 305. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a), 1144. See also Giles v. NYLCare
Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1987).
21. Roark, 307 F. 3d at 306. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (providing for civil action
against a plan fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty) and § 1132 (a)(1)(B) (providing a cause
of action for benefits erroneously denied to a plaintiff).
22. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
23. Roark, 307 F.3d at 307. The Pegram court explained that HMOs make eligibility
decisions to determine whether the particular treatment is covered under the plan; treat-
ment decisions about how to treat a patient's condition; and mixed eligibility and treatment
decisions, which determine whether one treatment option is better suited and needed im-
mediately. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228. Pegram held that claims falling under "mixed eligibil-
ity and treatment decisions" do not fall with § 502(a)(2). Id.
24. Roark, 307 F.3d at 307-08.
25. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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Moran,26 that because neither Davila nor Calad's claims dupli-
cated the causes of action enumerated in ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B),
ERISA could not completely preempt their state law causes of ac-
tion.27
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari28 to deter-
mine whether the "interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent
remedial scheme" of ERISA § 502(a) completely preempted the
causes of action claimed by Davila and Calad under the THCLA
Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion for the unanimous
Court. 0 Part II, Subpart A2' of the opinion addressed the issue of
whether Davila and Calad's causes of action arose under federal
law for purposes of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.2 Under the
"well-pleaded complaint rule," a cause of action arises under fed-
eral law only when the plaintiff clearly pleads a federal claim in
his complaint.2 The Court noted that a cause of action cannot be
found to arise under federal law only on the basis of an antici-
pated federal defense. 4 However, Justice Thomas explained an
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule: Removal of a state
claim is proper when the federal statute "wholly displaces the
state law cause of action through complete preemption" because,
in such instances, the state claim comes within the scope of the
federal statute, even if the plaintiff bases her complaint solely on
state law. 5 Based on this exception, the Court asserted that
26. 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
27. Roark, 307 F.3d at 310-11.
28. Certiorari is "[an extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion,
directing a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 220 (7th ed. 1999).
29. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2492. Neither Aetna nor CIGNA argued on appeal that Davila
and Calad's claims fell under § 502(a)(2) and the Court determined they could resolve the
case "entirely by reference" under § 502(a)(1)(B); thus, the Court did not address §
502(a)(2). Id. at 2494 n.1.
30. Id. The majority opinion included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter. Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion, in
which Justice Breyer joined. Id.
31. Id. at 2494. Part I of the opinion includes a recitation of the facts and procedural
history of Davila and Calad's cases. Id. at 2493.
32. Id. The court of appeals decided this issue in the affirmative before determining
that ERISA does not preempt Davila and Calad's causes of action. Roark, 307 F.3d 304-05.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court analyzed this issue in full. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
33. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2494. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. Of Cal. v. Construction Labor-
ers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983) and Taylor v. Anderson, 234
U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)).
34. Id. (citing Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)).
35. Id. at 2495 (citing Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)).
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ERISA is a federal statute that "wholly displaces" Davila and Ca-
lad's state causes of action.36
In Subpart B of Part II, the majority outlined ERISA's purpose,
which is to make certain that federal, rather than state, govern-
ment is solely responsible for regulating employee benefit plans."
Specifically, the Court established that the comprehensive statute
includes "an integrated system of procedures for enforcement." 8
Based on ERISA's stated purpose and objectives, the majority con-
cluded that, because Congress intended the remedies provided
under ERISA to be exclusive, state law causes of action that "du-
plicate, supplement, or supplant" the remedies included in ERISA
conflict with Congress' intent and thus are preempted. 9 In order
to illustrate ERISA's strong preemptive force, the Court cited Met-
ropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, which compared the lan-
guage of ERISA with the language of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act of 1947 (LMRA), and found ERISA's preemptive force
parallel with that of the LMRA.4° Therefore, the Court held that
ERISA converts state causes of action that duplicate, supplant, or
supplement ERISA causes of action into federal ones for purposes
of removal, just as the LMRA does.4
In Part III of the majority opinion, Justice Thomas examined
the language of ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) 42 and explained that this
straightforward provision allows participants or beneficiaries who
believe they are entitled to certain benefits under their plan to sue
under ERISA in order to receive those benefits.43 Hence, the Court
opined that ERISA would completely preempt Davila and Calad's
state law negligence causes of action if they could have brought
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)).
38. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Massachusetts Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134, 147 (1985)). Justice Thomas explained: '[Tihe detailed provisions of § 502(a) set forth
a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the need
for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging
the formation of employee benefit plans." Id. (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54).
39. Id. (citing Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54-56 and Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498
U.S. 133, 143-45 (1990)).
40. Id. at 2495- 96 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66
(1987)).
41. Id. (citing Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968)).
42. § 502(a)(1)(B) states: "A civil action may be brought- (1) by a participant or benefi-
ciary... (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan."
43. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2496.
Winter 2005 349
Duquesne Law Review
their suits under ERISA § 502 (a)(1)(B) and if neither Aetna nor
CIGNA had any duty to the plaintiffs independent of ERISA. "
Justice Thomas next turned to the precise issue of whether
Davila and Calad's causes of action fell within the scope of ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B), and examined the complaints, the THCLA and the
various plan documents to decide the issue.45 The Court pointed
out that Davila and Calad complained only of their respective
benefit plans' refusal to cover particular treatments recommended
by their treating physicians.46 In addition, the sole relationship
between Davila and Calad and their respective benefit plans was
Aetna and CIGNA's administration of each respondent's ERISA-
regulated employee benefit program." Thus, under ERISA, the
majority revealed Davila and Calad both could have paid for their
respective recommended treatments and sued Aetna and CIGNA
for reimbursement.48
In response to the alternative to sue for reimbursement, Davila
and Calad contended that Aetna and CIGNA each had an inde-
pendent legal duty under the THCLA to exercise ordinary care;
thus, civil action to enforce this duty does not fall within the scope
of ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).49 Justice Thomas responded to this ar-
gument by examining the duty of ordinary care imposed under
THCLA and concluded that if an HMO correctly determines a par-
ticular treatment is not covered, the proximate cause of the par-
ticipant or beneficiary's injuries is the plan's failure to cover the
particular treatment rather than the denial of coverage. ° The
Court recognized that, under the THCLA, a managed care entity
has no obligation to provide a treatment that the plan does not
cover.5 Therefore, Justice Thomas concluded, neither Aetna nor
CIGNA had an independent duty of ordinary care because their
liability derived only from the obligations instituted by the plans
they administered." Because the sole purpose of Davila and Ca-
lad's causes of action was to correct the denial of benefits promised




47. Id. at 2496-97.
48. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2497 (citing Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266,
274 (3rd Cir. 2001)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2497-98.
51. Id. at 2498 (citing TEXAS CIv. PRAc. & REM. § 88.002(d)).
52. Id.
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seek a remedy for Aetna and CIGNA's violation of an independent
legal duty, the Court decided the causes of action fell within the
scope of, and were completely preempted by, ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).
Therefore, the causes of action were removable to federal district
court.5 3
In Subpart B of Part III, the majority examined and rebutted
the reasons for what it determined to be the court of appeals' er-
roneous conclusions.54 In response to the court of appeals' reliance
on the distinction that Davila and Calad asserted "tort claims for
tort damages," rather than "contract claims for contract damages,"
Justice Thomas stressed that ascribing such labels to claims in
order to distinguish whether they are preempted would result in
parties dodging ERISA's preemptive scope by merely identifying
their claims as actions for tortious breach of contract.55 In addi-
tion, the Court asserted that state causes of action providing for
remedies outside those authorized by ERISA are not beyond the
scope of ERISA's civil enforcement mechanism.56
The Court then directly refuted the lower court's conclusion that
the wording of Davila and Calad's benefit plans was immaterial
and declared that the wording is, as a matter of law, material.
Justice Thomas indicated, contrary to the lower court's belief, that
the Court did not imply in Rush Prudential that ERISA's preemp-
tive force is limited to state causes of action that exactly duplicate
an ERISA § 502(a) cause of action.58 Instead, the Court asserted
that a prerequisite for state causes of action to be duplicative be-
fore ERISA can preempt them is both inconsistent with precedent
and with Congress' intention that the ERISA civil enforcement
mechanism be exclusive.59
Davila and Calad presented an argument in the Supreme Court
that they did not present in the lower courts: Under ERISA §
514(b)(2)(A), ERISA did not preempt their causes of action be-
53. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2498.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2498-99 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985)).
56. Id. at 2499. Justice Thomas cited Pilot Life, Metropolitan Life, and Ingersoll-Rand
to illustrate the notion that ERISA may preempt state causes of action labeled "tort or tort-
like," in which the parties sought remedies outside those ERISA authorizes. Id. (citing
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 43; Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S at 61-62; Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at
136).
57. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2499.
58. Id. at 2499. See Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 379.
59. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2499. (citing Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 136 and Metropolitan
Life, 481 U.S. at 61).
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cause THCLA regulates insurance."0 In striking this argument,
the Court pointed to the "overpowering federal policy" in ERISA §
502(a) and Congress' intent that ERISA create an exclusive fed-
eral remedy, thus preempting state law claims." Justice Thomas
maintained that Congress, when drafting ERISA, consciously
chose to include particular remedies and exclude others.62 The
majority therefore decided that to allow participants and benefici-
aries to receive state law remedies that Congress chose not to in-
clude in ERISA would undermine the federal scheme Congress
had in mind.63
In the final portion of the opinion, the majority attacked the
court of appeals' reliance on Pegram v. Herdrich in holding that
ERISA did not preempt Davila and Calad's causes of action be-
cause the claims do not "relate to an employee-benefit plan."4 Pe-
gram held that HMOs making mixed eligibility and treatment de-
cisions cannot be treated as fiduciaries.65 Under ERISA, eligibility
determinations are fiduciary in nature.66 The Court stated that
HMOs exercising discretionary authority or responsibility in their
administration of employee benefit programs when making eligi-
bility decisions must necessarily be fiduciaries.67 To bolster this
conclusion, Justice Thomas cited ERISA § 503, requiring partici-
pants and beneficiaries who were denied benefits to have a "full
and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision
denying the claim."8 Thus, the Court decided that refusal to clas-
sify Aetna and CIGNA, who both have discretionary authority
over benefits determinations, as fiduciaries would clash with
ERISA's regulatory scheme.69
60. Id. at 2500. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), which provides, "nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regu-
lates insurance, banking, or securities."
61. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2500 (citing Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 375).
62. Id. (citing Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54).
63. Id. Justice Thomas explained further, "[u]nder ordinary principles of conflict pre-
emption, then, even a state law that can arguably be characterized as 'regulating insur-
ance' will be preempted if it provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits out-
side of, or in addition to, ERISA's remedial scheme." Id.
64. Id.
65. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2501 (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215-16).
66. Id. (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brusch, 489 U.S. 101, 111-13 (1989)).
ERISA defines a fiduciary as one who has discretionary authority or responsibility in ad-
ministering employee benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii).
67. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2502.
68. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2).
69. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2502.
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After classifying Aetna and CIGNA as fiduciaries, Justice Tho-
mas recognized that Pegram's holding was inapplicable to Davila
and Calad's causes of action because that holding only applies
where negligence also stems from medical maltreatment by an
HMO that is either a treating physician or the physician's em-
ployer." The majority concluded that, because neither Aetna nor
CIGNA employed Davila and Calad's treating physicians, nor
were Aetna and CIGNA treating physicians themselves, their de-
cisions not to cover Vioxx and an extended hospital stay were pure
eligibility decisions, rendering Pegram inapplicable.71
Justice Thomas concluded the majority opinion by holding that
"respondents' causes of action, brought only to remedy the denial
of benefits under ERISA-regulated benefit plans, fall within the
scope of, and are completely preempted by, ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B),
and thus removable to federal district court.""
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer joined, concurred
with the majority's opinion because its conclusion was consistent
with precedent, but wrote separately to advocate for another look
at "what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime." "
The concurring opinion noted that ERISA preempts almost every
available state law remedy but does not offer many federal substi-
tutes for those remedies. 4 As a result, Justice Ginsburg asserted,
"make-whole" relief is unavailable to persons whose claims are
preempted by ERISA.7" The concurring opinion asserted that
these remedial problems demand reconsideration of the limited
consequential damages ERISA § 502(a)(3) provides."6
In the search for an expansion of the limited remedies available
under ERISA, Justice Ginsburg noted the Government's sugges-
tion that ERISA "may allow at least some form of 'make-whole'
relief against a breaching fiduciary in light of the general avail-
70. Id. (citing Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 109 (2nd Cir. 2003)).
71. Id.
72. Id. The Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded Davila and
Calad's cases for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. Id.
73. Id. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346
F.3d 442, 453 (3rd Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)).
74. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing DiFelice, 346 F.3d at
456).
75. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
76. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg referred to Mertens v. Hewitt Asso-
ciates, where the Court held that "equitable relief" under ERISA § 503(a)(3) only allows for
equitable relief, such as an injunction, and not for compensatory damages. Id. (citing
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248 (1993)).
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ability of such relief in equity."77 Although Davila and Calad re-
fused to amend their complaints to bring causes of action under
ERISA (and thus would not benefit from the Government's sug-
gestion), Justice Ginsburg asserted that the Government's sugges-
tion might prove effective for others in similar situations.78 The
concurring opinion concluded, "Congress ... intended ERISA to
replicate the core principles of trust remedy law, including the
make-whole standard of relief."79
The "ultimate touchstone" in answering the question of whether
a federal law preempts a state law is the intent of Congress. ° An
examination of the purpose, structure and express language of the
federal law comprises the determination of congressional intent.8
The Conference Committee on ERISA demonstrated that Congress
intended for ERISA's "preemptive scope [to be] as broad as its lan-
guage."82 Senator Williams illustrated the breadth of ERISA pre-
emption at the time of ERISA's enactment in 1974:
It should be stressed that . . . the substantive and enforce-
ment provisions of the conference substitute are intended to
preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating
the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regula-
tion of employee benefit plans. This principle is to apply in its
broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments, or
any instrumentality thereof, which have the force or effect of
law.
83
In order to facilitate the goal that regulation of employee benefit
plans be an exclusive federal concern' and to avoid inconsistency
between state and federal laws, Congress included various safe-
guards in ERISA, such as § 514(a), which provides for express,
77. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2504 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27-28, n.
13 (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83)). ERISA § 502(a)(3) does not allow awards of money damages
against a non-fiduciary. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
78. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2504 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
79. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by
"Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trial of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West. 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2003)).
80. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 208.
81. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56 (1990).
82. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983) (citing H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-
1280, 383 (1974)). Originally, the bill that was to become ERISA contained a limited pre-
emption clause, which applied to state laws that related to subjects expressly included in
ERISA. Id. However, the Conference Committee opted for broader preemption. Id.
83. 120 Cong. Rec. 29197, 29933 (1974).
84. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 523.
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expansive preemption, and § 502(a), ERISA's civil enforcement
scheme, which is essential in carrying out ERISA's objectives.85 In
1987, the Supreme Court decided Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
v. Taylor,86 where it examined § 502 and Congress' intent for pre-
empted claims that fall within the scope of the civil enforcement
mechanism to arise under federal law.87
In Metropolitan Life, Arthur Taylor, an employee of General
Motors, received benefits from his employee benefit plan after a
psychiatrist deemed him emotionally unable to work." Although
the psychiatrist determined Taylor to be fit to work six weeks
later, Taylor did not return to his employment; rather, he filed a
supplemental claim for benefits alleging that work-related back
injuries he sustained in 1961 prevented him from continuing to
work."9 Six months after a General Motors physician deemed Tay-
lor fit to work, Taylor filed suit against General Motors and Met-
ropolitan Life Insurance Co. for compensatory damages for money
contractually owed to him and for mental anguish due to the
breach of contract.90
In holding that Metropolitan Life and General Motors' removal
of Taylor's claims to federal court was proper, the Court relied on
the exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, which allowed
Congress to thoroughly preempt a distinct area of law such that
any civil complaint raising claims within that area must be char-
acterized as federal in nature.9 In the majority opinion for the
unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor recognized that since the late
1960s, the Court distinguished claims under the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA)" as falling within the excep-
tion to the well-pleaded complaint rule. 3
The Court noted that while ERISA preemption is not sufficient
to convert a state claim into one arising under federal law, Fran-
chise Tax Board suggested that if the claim is within the scope of §
502(a), the Avco principle, which provides for conversion of state
85. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990). See also 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1144(a), 1132(a).
86. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
87. Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 67.
88. Id. at 60-61.
89. Id. at 61.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 63-64.
92. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994).
93. Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 64 (citing Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 357
(1968)). The Avco principle provides that any preempted suit entirely displaced by § 301 of
the LMRA is "purely a creature of federal law." Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 24-25.
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claims to federal claims under § 301 of the LMRA, may apply to
ERISA.94 Justice O'Connor identified the similar language of §
502(f) (ERISA's jurisdictional subsection) and § 301 of the LMRA
as the basis for holding that preempted claims under ERISA that
also fall within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement mechanism
arise under federal law.95 To further bolster this holding, the
Court cited the Conference Report on ERISA: "All such actions in
Federal or State courts are to be regarded as arising under the
laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought un-
der section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947." 9"
Because Congress intended the jurisdictional provision of ERISA's
civil enforcement mechanism to function in the same way as § 301
of the LMRA, any claim that is both preempted by ERISA and
within the scope of §502(a) will arise under federal law and is re-
movable to federal court.
97
One of the first cases in which the Supreme Court examined
ERISA's provision for express preemption under § 514 was Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,9' in which the Court determined the pre-
cise meaning of the phrase "relate to" as it is used in that section.99
In Shaw, the Court examined the New York Human Rights Law,
which prohibited discrimination in employee benefit plans on the
basis of pregnancy, and the New York Disability Benefits Law,
which required employers to pay sick leave benefits to employees
who could not work due to pregnancy."°0 Looking to the plain lan-
guage of the provision, the Court established that "a law 'relates
94. Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63.
95. § 502(f) provides, "[tihe district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction,
without respect to the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties, to grant the
relief provided for in subsection (a) of this section in any action." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f). Cf §
301 of the LMRA: "Suits ... may be brought in any district court of the United States hav-
ing jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
96. Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1880, 327
(1974)).
97. Id.
98. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
99. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a), which provides that ERISA
shall "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA.
100. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96. Delta Air Lines, Inc. and Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, whose employee benefit plans did not provide benefits to employees disabled by preg-
nancy as required by the New York Human Rights Law and the Disability Benefits law,
sued New York state agencies and officials alleging ERISA preemption of those state laws.
Id.
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to' an employee benefit plan.., if it has a connection with or ref-
erence to such a plan."''
After examining the legislative history of ERISA, °2 the Court in
Shaw concluded that Congress intended that the phrase "relate
to" be construed broadly, stating that Congress' inclusion of provi-
sions such as § 514(b) (exempting generally applicable criminal
statutes from ERISA preemption) would have been meaningless if
a more narrow view of the phrase were adopted. 103 Based on this
broad interpretation of the phrase, the Court concluded that both
the Human Rights Law and the Disability Benefits law "related
to" the employee benefit plans that Delta Airlines and Metropoli-
tan Life provided,0 making the phrase an integral consideration
in determining whether ERISA preempts state law.'
In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,06 the Court considered
the issue of ERISA preemption over state law claims based in tort
and contract, addressing ERISA's preemption provisions under §
514, the exceptions to those provisions, and the legislative intent
of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions under § 502.17
In her opinion, written for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor
summarized § 514(a), ERISA's preemption clause, § 514(b)(2)(A),
the saving clause, and § 514(b)(2)(B), the deemer clause: "If a state
law 'relate[s] to . .. employee benefit plan[s],' it is pre-empted.
The saving clause excepts from the pre-emption clause laws that
'regulate insurance.' The deemer clause makes clear that a state
law that 'purport[s] to regulate insurance cannot deem an em-
ployee benefit plan to be an 'insurance company. '" 108 In examining
101. Id.
102. Id. at 98-99 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, 383; 120 Cong. Rec., 29197, 29933).
103. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98.
104. Id. at 100. The Court held that ERISA preempted the Human Rights Law 'only
insofar as it prohibit[ed] practices that are lawful under federal law." Id. at 108. The Court
then held that ERISA did not preempt the Disability Benefits Law because it is exempt
under § 4(b)(3) as a disability insurance law. Id.
105. See Ingersoll Rand, 498 U.S. at 138 ("The key to § 514(a) is found in the words
'relate to.'").
106. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
107. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 41. Everate W. Dedeaux suffered a work-related back injury
while working for Entex, Inc., which provided employee benefits through Pilot Life Insur-
ance Co. (Pilot Life). Id. at 43. Pilot Life terminated Dedeaux's permanent disability bene-
fits after only two years, prompting Dedeaux to file a complaint in federal district court for
tortious breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and fraud in the inducement, seeking
damages for failure to provide benefits under the policy. Id. The district court held that
ERISA preempted Dedeaux's claims and granted summary judgment for Pilot Life; the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at
44.
108. Id. at 45. See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), 1144(b)(2)(A), 1144(b)(2)(B).
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Dedeaux's common law claims, the Court recognized that his
causes of actions "related to" an employee benefit plan and fell
within the broad preemptive scope of § 514(a); hence, ERISA
would preempt his causes of action unless they fell within an ex-
ception to § 514(a)."'0
Dedeaux argued that his claim for tortious breach of contract
and the Mississippi law of bad faith were exempt from ERISA pre-
emption because the law was one regulating insurance under §
514(b)(2)(A).11° In striking this claim, the Court stated that the
determination of whether a state law regulates insurance requires
taking a "common sense view" of the language of the clause and
applying the three criteria used under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act' to determine whether the law is in the "business of insur-
ance."' Applying the "common sense view" of the language of the
saving clause, Justice O'Connor opined that the term "regulates"
suggests the law must have a specific relation to the insurance
industry; such relation was lacking in the Mississippi bad faith
law."' Furthermore, the Court concluded the Mississippi law did
not gain support from the criteria set forth in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act."14 Specifically, the Court determined that the bad
faith law did not spread policyholder risk because it only provided
an opportunity for policyholders to obtain punitive damages in the
event of a breach;"' and the law was not integral to the insurer-
insured relationship because it was developed from "general prin-
ciples of tort and contract law."
16
Justice O'Connor further recognized that the Court must exam-
ine the legislative intent of the civil enforcement provisions pro-
109. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47-48 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 and Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) for the proposition that a state law relates to
a benefit plan "if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan").
110. Id. at 48.
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2004).
112. Pilot Life, 581 U.S. at 48. The Court outlined the three criteria under the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act: "First, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a
policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relation-
ship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to
entities within the insurance industry." Id. at 49-50 (quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v.
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)).
113. Id. at 50. The Court further recognized that the Mississippi law has its roots in
general principles of tort and contract law; thus, any breach of contract may result in puni-
tive damages under the law. Id.
114. Id. at 51.
115. Id. at 50.
116. Id. at 51. The Court noted that, at best, Dedeaux's claims fell under only one of the
factors under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id.
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vided in § 502(a) when interpreting the saving clause because
Dedeaux sought remedies for Pilot Life's improper processing of
his claim for benefits."7  Recognizing that Congress intended §
502(a) to be exclusive, the Court noted that the civil enforcement
scheme in that section is an "essential tool" for achieving ERISA's
objectives."' The Court referred to Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell,"' in which the Court established "the
presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a stat-
ute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive leg-
islative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for
enforcement." 20 Thus, Justice O'Connor stated, "[t]he policy
choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the ex-
clusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely
undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were
free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in
ERISA."' 2. As such, the Mississippi bad faith law was not "saved"
under § 514(b)(2)(A).'22
In 1990, the Court decided Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,'23
in which McClendon sued his employer, Ingersoll-Rand Company,
based on the loss of pension benefits he would have received had
the company not terminated him due to a reduction in work-
force. 24 The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
ERISA preempted McClendon's common law claim that Ingersoll-
Rand Company unlawfully terminated his employment in order to
prevent him from receiving his pension benefits.'25
In holding that McClendon's claim "related to" an ERISA benefit
plan, Justice O'Connor noted the Texas cause of action for unlaw-
ful termination both specifically referred to and was premised on
117. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52.
118. Id.
119. A beneficiary of Metropolitan Mutual Life Insurance Company brought an action
seeking punitive damages on the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 409(a),
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). Massachusetts Mutual Life, 473 U.S. at 136-38. The Court held that §
409(a) neither expressly nor impliedly provided for such damages to the beneficiary. Id. at
148.
120. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 53 (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 147, quoting Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S 77, 97 (1981)).
121. Id. at 54.
122. Id.
123. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
124. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 135. McClendon's complaint sounded in tort and con-
tract and asked for compensatory and punitive damages; none of his claims alleged ERISA
causes of action. Id. at 136.
125. Id. at 135.
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the existence of a pension plan.128 In response to McClendon's ar-
gument that the language of § 514(c)(2)'27 limits preemption under
§ 514(a) to state laws affecting plan terms, conditions or admini-
stration, the Court explained that § 514(c)(2) expanded the defini-
tion of "State" "for preemption purposes in order to 'include' state
agencies and instrumentalities whose actions might not otherwise
be considered state law."'28 Justice O'Connor indicated that Con-
gress did not intend to restrict ERISA preemption to state laws
that affect plan terms and conditions; if it did, it would not have
placed such a restriction in a separate definition section while us-
ing the phrase "relate to" in the preemption provision.'29
The Court further articulated the notion of conflict preemption
by reasoning that even if McClendon's Texas cause of action was
not expressly preempted under § 514(a), it would be preempted
because it was in direct conflict with an ERISA cause of action
under § 510.20 Because the Texas cause of action was an alterna-
tive and conflicting remedy to that provided in ERISA § 510, Con-
gress' intent was frustrated; thus, ERISA preempted the cause of
action even absent express preemption under § 514(a).'
13
In Pegram v. Herdrich,2 the Court addressed the issue of
whether treatment decisions made by a health maintenance or-
ganization, acting through its physician employees, are fiduciary
acts under ERISA, thus allowing for a cause of action based on
breach of fiduciary duty.13 Herdrich brought medical malpractice
126. Id. at 140. The Court noted that, in order for McClendon to prevail under the Texas
law, he must show that a plan exists and that the employer intended to defeat McClendon's
receipt of pension benefits; thus, the Court must direct its inquiry to the plan and whether
the cause of action "relates to" an ERISA plan. Id.
127. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2), stating, "The term 'State' includes a State, any political
subdivisions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate,
directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this
subchapter." The ERISA definition of "State" as provided in § 3(10) is "any State of the
United States, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa,
Guam, Wake Island, and the Capital Zone." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(10).
128. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 141.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 142. "It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to
which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan ... or for the purpose
of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become enti-
tled under the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
131. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142.
132. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
133. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 214. Dr. Lori Pegram, a physician under Carle Clinic Associa-
tion, P.C., Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc. (Carle), decided that Cynthia Herdrich
needed to wait eight days after the discovery of an inflamed mass in her abdomen for an
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suits against the Carle Clinic and her physician, Dr. Pegram, in
state court, also alleging two counts of state law fraud.13 After
removal to federal district court and a grant of summary judgment
for defendants on one of Herdrich's fraud claims, Herdrich
amended her remaining fraud claim to allege that the provision in
her HMO rewarding physicians for limiting medical care consti-
tuted an anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty under 29
U.S.C. § 1109(a).
3 5
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' holding, from which
Carle appealed, stated that "incentives can rise to the level of a
breach where . . .the fiduciary trust between plan participants
and plan fiduciaries no longer exists." 36 Justice Souter, writing
for a unanimous Court, recognized that, under ERISA, a fiduciary
is someone "acting in the capacity of manager, administrator, or
financial advisor to a plan." 7 The Court noted that although
Carle was not an ERISA fiduciary by virtue of its administration
or exercise of discretionary authority over its own HMO business,
it might be a fiduciary if it administers the employee benefit plan
subject to ERISA.'
Acknowledging that fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA are
similar to fiduciaries in the common law of trusts, the Court
stated that beyond the threshold of the fiduciary duty of loyalty to
the interests of beneficiaries, the analogy between ERISA fiduciar-
ies and trust fiduciaries is problematic.9 Thus, the threshold
question became whether the plan employee who provides services
was acting as a fiduciary at the time he or she took the action of
which the beneficiary or participant complained.'4
ultrasound, to be performed at a Carle facility fifty miles away. Id. at 215. Herdrich's
appendix ruptured before the eight days expired, causing peritonitis. Id.
134. Id. at 215-16.
135. Id. at 216. § 1109(a) provides:
[Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the re-
sponsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall
be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from
each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have
been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to
such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate.
136. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 217 (quoting Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 367 (7th Cir.
1998)).
137. Id. at 222. See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(A)(i)-(iii).
138. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 223.
139. Id. at 225. ERISA fiduciaries not only act in the interests of participants in and
beneficiaries to the plan, they also may act as employers or plans sponsors; thus, they tend
to have adverse financial interests. Id.
140. Id. at 226.
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Justice Souter then discussed the types of treatment decisions
plan fiduciaries make: "Pure eligibility decisions" depend on
whether the plan covers a particular medical procedure or treat-
ment; "treatment decisions" involve a choice concerning how to
diagnose and treat a patient's condition; and "mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions" involve both whether the plan covers the par-
ticular treatment and how to diagnose and treat the condition. 141
Dr. Pegram's decision that Herdrich wait eight days to receive an
ultrasound at a Carle facility fifty miles away was an "inextricably
mixed" eligibility and treatment decision because Dr. Pegram
made a diagnosis and treatment judgment, which repeatedly oc-
curs in medical administrative decisions; hence, mixed eligibility
and treatment decisions are not fiduciary in nature.4 4 Therefore,
Carle was not a fiduciary to the extent it made mixed eligibility
and treatment decisions acting through its physician employee,
Dr. Pegram.14 Herdrich's claim did not state an ERISA cause of
action under 29 U.S.C. § 1109.'4
ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3)145 address participants'
rights to recover for wrongs committed against them.146  In
147
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, former employees who participated
in the ERISA-regulated Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan brought an
action for money damages for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging
that Hewitt Associates did not adjust the plan's actuarial assump-
tions to reflect additional costs imposed by the participants' early
retirements; thus, the participants received far less benefits than
they would had the plan been adequately funded.4 4 The Supreme
Court faced the issue of whether, under ERISA § 502, a partici-
pant can seek money damages against nonfiduciaries who partici-
141. Id. at 228-29. Mixed eligibility decisions involve the question "whether one treat-
ment option is so superior to another under the circumstances, and needed so promptly,
that a decision to proceed with it would meet the medical necessity requirement that condi-
tions the HMO's obligation to provide or pay for that particular procedure at that time in
that case." Id. at 229.
142. Id. at 229.
143. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231
144. Id. at 237.
145. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) provides:
A civil action may be brought- by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to en-
join any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations
or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or terms of the plan.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
147. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
148. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 250.
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pate in a fiduciary's breach of duty.'49 Even though the remedies
available in § 502 apply only to fiduciaries, the Court decided to
hear the case to determine whether the participants were entitled
to monetary damages under ERISA § 502(a).'
Acknowledging that ERISA has its roots in the common law of
trusts, Justice Scalia concluded that,
[since all relief available for breach of trust could be obtained
from a court of equity, limiting the sort of relief obtainable
under § 502(a)(3) to 'equitable relief in the sense of 'whatever
relief a common law court of equity could provide in such a
case' would limit the relief not at all.6 '
Because elsewhere in ERISA, Congress drew distinctions be-
tween "equitable" and "remedial" relief, and between equitable
and "legal" relief,6 2 interpreting the phrase "equitable relief' in §
502(a)(3) to mean "any relief' would render Congress' inclusion of
the word "equitable" in the statute unnecessary.6 2  Thus, the
Court concluded that "equitable relief," as used in § 502, included
not monetary damages, but traditional types of equitable relief,
such as injunctions, mandamus and restitution.'54 As a result, ex-
tracontractual damages not expressly provided for in ERISA § 502
are unavailable to participants or beneficiaries who seek to re-
cover for wrongs committed against them by their benefit plans.55
More recently, in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson,5 ' Justice Scalia distinguished between restitution al-
lowed at law and restitution allowed in equity, and concluded
that, because restitution allowed at law provides monetary relief,
such restitution is not "equitable" as that term is used in ERISA. 5'
The Court quoted Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Associates' Health & Wel-
149. Id. at 251.
150. Id. at 255.
151. Id. at 257.
152. See ERISA § 409(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1 109(a).
153. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258.
154. Id. at 256-57.
155. Id.
156. 534 U.S. 204 (2002). Great-West paid Mrs. Knudson's medical expenses for injuries
she sustained in a car accident. Id. at 207. After the Knudson's received a $650,000 set-
tlement from Hyundai, Great-West sued the Knudsons for specific performance of a reim-
bursement provision in its plan, which provided that plan beneficiaries who had recovered
from third-party tortfeasors must make restitution to the plan for benefits the plan paid to
the beneficiary. Id. at 207-208. The Court disallowed Great-West's claim for reimburse-
ment. Id. at 221.
157. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212-13.
Winter 2005 363
Duquesne Law Review
fare Plan v. Wells: 8 "A claim for money due and owing under a
contract is 'quintessentially an action at law.'"'59 Hence, the Court
stated that because monetary damages are necessarily legal in
nature, ERISA § 502 (a)(3) does not permit causes of action impos-
ing personal liability for contractual obligations to pay money.'60
The governing case law concerning ERISA preemption has con-
sistently provided that state law causes of action that "relate to"
an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan are preempted unless
they fall within one of the exceptions to ERISA's preemption pro-
visions.' 6' As such, participants and beneficiaries like Davila and
Calad, who wish to bring suit against their plans to remedy a de-
nial of benefits, must bring their suits in federal court and state
ERISA causes of action. Therefore, the holding in Aetna is in
harmony with precedent. However, as Justice Ginsburg pointed
out in her concurring opinion,"2 ERISA's expansive preemptive
force, coupled with the limited remedies it provides, leaves many
injured parties without legal recourse.'
Congress' original intent in enacting ERISA was to protect em-
ployees who, prior to ERISA, were entitled to mere nominal pen-
sion benefits or to the assets in the pension plan, whichever was
lower."M In addition, ERISA encouraged employers to provide
benefit plans to their employees; employers were not required to
do so prior to ERISA's enactment.' 65 However, it appears from the
long line of Supreme Court cases, providing for complete preemp-
tion of beneficiaries' and participants' claims, that ERISA has
done everything but protect employees. Instead, ERISA appears
to provide an advantage to HMOs and other benefit plans by en-
suring them a federal forum and shielding them from liability for
any legal remedy.66 Indeed, the Supreme Court, on three occa-
sions, has held that "equitable relief," as used in ERISA, refers to
relief allowed in equity at the time before the courts of law and
equity were merged in the 1930s.167 Thus, only traditional equita-
158. 213 F.3d 398 (7th Cir. 2000).
159. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 213 F.3d at 401).
160. Id. at 221.
161. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96; Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 140.
162. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
163. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
164. DiFelice, 346 U.S. at 454 (Becker J., concurring).
165. Id. (Becker, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 453 (Becker J., concurring).
167. See Russell, 473 U.S. 146-47; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256-57; Great West, 534 U.S. at
221.
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ble remedies are available under ERISA; one may not seek legal
relief in the nature of compensatory damages.'68 The Court rein-
forced the advantage to HMOs and benefit plans with its holding
in Aetna that ERISA completely preempts state law claims seek-
ing damages for harm resulting from a denial of benefits.
Justice Ginsburg pointed out that if Davila and Calad had
amended their complaints to bring ERISA causes of action, then
they may have been able to sue Aetna and CIGNA as breaching
fiduciaries.'69 However, the court of appeals dismissed Davila and
Calad's claims with prejudice as a result of their refusal to amend
their complaints;7 ' hence, they are precluded from ever seeking
relief for the injuries they endured as a result of Aetna and
CIGNA's eligibility decisions. To the average American citizen,
this outcome must surely seem unjust. The lesson to be learned in
the wake of the decision in Aetna is to recognize that the possibil-
ity of "make-whole" relief under ERISA is almost impossible. 7'
Because of the limited remedies available under § 502(a)(3), as
well as the consistency with which the Court has held for federal
preemption of state law claims against ERISA-regulated benefit
plans, care must be taken in preparing for litigation concerning
ERISA claims. Otherwise, injured persons, in positions similar to
that of Davila and Calad, will likely be unable to receive compen-
sation for benefits denied them, even if their complaints state
ERISA causes of action.
ERISA is rooted in the common law of trusts,'72 which provides
for a make-whole standard of relief." 3 Arguably, ERISA should
then also provide for make-whole relief in the form of something
other than strict equitable relief. Although, in its decisions con-
cerning ERISA preemption, the Court has aimed to carry out Con-
gress' intent, it appears that the Court has instead taken the
analysis a step too far by precluding those injured by their ERISA-
regulated plans from obtaining any compensation for their inju-
168. However, it may be possible for one to realize "make-whole" relief against a breach-
ing fiduciary because the Court has disallowed awards of money damages only against non-
fiduciaries. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2504 (Ginsburg, concurring) (quoting Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae 27-28, n. 13 (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83)).
169. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2504 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 2493.
171. See Langbein, supra note 79, at 1319.
172. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257.
173. Langbein, supra note 79, at 1319. (Analyzing the Court's holdings in Russell,
Mertens and Great-West as being inconsistent with Congress' intent that "ERISA remedy
law replicate the core principles of trust remedy law").
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ries. 74 Therefore, it is imperative that both Congress and the Su-
preme Court take action to unravel the "unjust and increasingly




175. Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (quoting DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 453 (Becker, J., concur-
ring)).
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